Pension schemes in the Netherlands allow workers to redistribute their own pension wealth to increase the survivor pension of their partner. This paper uses a stated-preferences experiment that is explicitly designed for workers in the age group of 55 years and older to elicit their pension redistribution preferences. We find that the distribution of preferred levels of pension redistribution closely matches a normal distribution with an average preferred pension wealth redistribution of 50%. 35% of all individuals have such a preference. 33% of all individuals would prefer less redistribution, and 32% percent prefers to redistribute more pension income to the partner upon one's death. We further show that total family income during working life does not affect the redistribution to survivor pensions. However, the distribution of the contribution to total family income before retirement across partners, as well as the survival likelihood of the partner and the number of years the partner is expected to survive, have a significant causal impact on the preferred pension redistribution decision. The preference for redistribution to survivor pensions also depends significantly on personal characteristics, preferences and social attitude. Males have a significantly stronger preference for redistribution compared to females. Moreover, forward-looking, more risk averse and more altruistic individuals have a stronger preference to redistribute part of their pension wealth to a survivor pension. Finally, in particular when workers have the perception that their partner is more forward looking, they are willing to invest more in a survivor pension.
Introduction
Survivors' pensions are retirement benefits to a person whose spouse (or parent) has died. This social protection for survivors has been present in European society since the end of the 19th century and aims to insure against the social risk that the decease of one person (breadwinner) in the household results in a major loss of income for the other person(s) in the household. In 2014, survivor benefits represented almost 6% of the total expenses on social benefits in the European Union. This rate is almost equivalent to the social benefits for unemployment (5%) and disability (7%) (Eurostat 2017) . Since the 1990s, European pension systems have been subject to numerous reforms. These reforms include, among others, decreases in the generosity of pension benefits and increases in the eligibility age for early and statutory retirement (Gruber and Wise, 1998; Duval, 2005; Mastrobuoni, 2009; Hanel, 2010; Kangas et al., 2010; Börsch-Supan, 2012; Staubli and Zweimüller, 2013) . The legislation concerning survivors' benefits have also undergone substantial modifications in several European countries (e.g., Denmark, United Kingdom, Greece, and the Netherlands), mostly involving a reduction of the survivor benefits. 1 Individuals therefore become increasingly responsible for their own pension rights and retirement decisions, as well as for a sufficient pension provision of their surviving spouse (Frericks and Hoeppner, 2018) . In the Netherlands, the first-pillar survivor pension scheme (Surviving Dependents Act (Anw)) has been drastically curtailed, so that only a small percentage of people are still eligible to this benefit. The ensuing gap in household pension wealth has only been partially, in a highly fragmented manner, 1 For example, in Denmark, if people deceased before 1992, the benefits from the Danish ATP fund (the supplementary pension fund, which is a contribution-related pension) consist of an annuity, while for people who passed away in 1992 or later the benefit is a lump-sum payment. Moreover, if people started to participate in a pension scheme after 2002, the lump-sum payment decreases with age. The UK also introduced a system of lump-sum bereavement payments in 2001, which substituted the previous system of pensions paid exclusively to women. Survivors' benefits paid under this state earnings-related system were then lowered from 100% to 50% of the deceased's pension. Changes in legislation in Germany reduced the share of the deceased's pension paid to the surviving spouse for those who married after 2001. covered through second-pillar pension schemes (Staarink and Visser, 2017) . However, employees are offered the opportunity to supplement future survivor pensions at the moment of their retirement by substituting part of the pension benefits until their death by a survivor annuity which continues to make additional payments to the spouse after the death of the retired worker. This raises the question to what extent employees are willing to redistribute their own pension wealth to their surviving partner and what actually drives their decision to redistribute? This paper uses a stated-preferences approach to estimate Dutch workers' willingness to redistribute own pension wealth to increase the survivor pension of one's partner. Our statedpreferences experiment is explicitly designed for individuals in the age group of 55 years and older who are close to retirement and is part of the ROA Public Sector Employees Survey which was conducted in 2015. The core of our stated-preference experiment consists of the choices respondents make between five hypothetical, but realistic, pension redistribution outcomes in six different choice sets (vignette scenarios). These redistribution outcomes differ with respect to (1) the level of the monthly pension benefits until one's death and (2) the actuarially related pension of the widowed partner after one's death. The five consecutive steps of redistribution (in steps of 25%-points) range from no redistribution, where the widowed partner is only entitled to a first pillar old-age pension that -depending on the vignette scenario can be supplemented with partner's own pension wealthto full redistribution where the widowed partner receives the same pension income as when his/her partner was still alive.
In the vignettes, four key conditions are randomly changed: (1) monthly family income during working life, (2) the relative contribution to family income of both partners during working life, (3) the survival probability of the partner, and (4) the duration of the survival of the partner.
These conditions have been major determinants in recent OLG models of participation in joint life annuities and labor market behavior of families (e.g., Brown et al., 2000; Vidal-Meliá and Lejárraga-García, 2006; Fehr et al., 2017) .
The main reason we use a stated rather than revealed preferences approach is threefold.
First, current choices for redistribution of own pension wealth to survivor pensions will most likely lead to an underestimation of the true willingness to redistribute because they do not reflect the actual preferences of workers as the survivor pension options within current pension schemes are hard to comprehend for an average worker (Staarink and Visser 2017) . Second, the consequences of taking (no) additional insurance for a survivors pension gap is not actively communicated to people and many are therefore unaware of the financial risk which makes revealed preferences data unsuitable. Third, the vignettes we designed ensure that we know the respondent's choice alternatives and the conditions in which the choices are made. The variation in choices is sufficiently large and, by construction, exogenous to preferences, actual pension entitlements of the respondents and their spouses, as well as important conditions such as individual life expectancy and the share of the total household income generated by the respondent. Such conditions are, in general, impossible to meet when using observational data. Because of this exogenous variation, the effects we estimate can be interpreted causally.
Several studies have systematically investigated the extent to which the hypothetical behavior reported in vignette studies compares to actual behavior and show convincing evidence that the data generated through the use of vignettes is correlated to actual behavior (Peabody et al., 2000 (Peabody et al., , 2004 Eifler, 2007; Telser and Zweifel, 2007; Eggers, 2015) . In fact, stated-preferences experiments are widely used in marketing research (e.g., Louviere et al., 2002) , transportation and environmental science (Hensher, 1997) , and are also rapidly gaining ground in economics (see, e.g., Barsky et al., 1997; Revelt and Train, 1998; Van Soest et al., 2007; Kantarci and Van Soest, 2008; Braga et al., 2009; Benjamin et al., 2014; Van Soest and Vonkova, 2014; Wiswall and Zafar, 2017; Elsayed et al., 2018) .
The results of our analyzes show that the distribution of preferred levels of pension redistribution closely matches a normal distribution with an average preferred pension redistribution of 50%: 35% of all individuals have such a preference. 33% of all individuals would prefer less redistribution, and 32% percent prefers to redistribute more pension income to the partner upon one's death. We further show that the total family income during working life does not play a role in individuals' pension wealth redistribution to the survivor's pension. However, the distribution of the contribution to total family income before retirement across partners does matter for the preferred pension income redistribution. Compared to the situation in which someone contributes 100% to family income, those who contribute 25% (and their partner 75%) have a lower preference for full redistribution. Furthermore, the survival likelihood of the partner and the number of years the partner is expected to survive are significantly positively related to a stronger redistribution to the survivor's pension.
We further find that the preference for redistribution in favor of survivor pensions strongly depends on personal characteristics, preferences and social attitude. Males have a significantly stronger preference for redistribution compared to females. This difference in preferences is economically significant as it amounts to a third of a point increase on the 1 to 5 answer scale (about 11% of the overall mean). Age positively correlates with stronger preferences for pension redistribution, while highly educated workers prefer less redistribution. Third, we find that forward looking, more risk averse and more altruistic individuals have a stronger preference to redistribute part of their pension wealth to a survivor pension. Finally, we show that the respondents' perception of the personality traits of their partner also influences their redistribution preferences. Conditional on respondents' own time preference, we find that having a partner who is more forward looking increases the willingness to redistribute. Most interesting, the coefficient of the perception of the partner's time preference is equal in size to the one of the respondents' own time preference, indicating that survivors pension decisions are likely to be a joint decision and that partner's preferences should not be disregarded when analyzing these decisions.
Most recent studies on the importance of family insurance for social security theoretically analyze these issues on the macro-level using overlapping generation models and focus on the impact of survivors pensions on labor participation (e.g., Nishiyama and Smetters, 2007; Fehr et al., 2008; Kaygusuz, 2015; Sánchez Martín and SánchezMarcos, 2010; Fehr et al., 2017; Nishiyama 2018) . These studies primarily depend on simulation techniques to establish that survivor pensions discourage labor market participation of married women and, hence, can have negative welfare effects. However, the simulation studies of Nishiyama and Smetters (2007) and Fehr et al. (2008) also show that when intergenerational redistribution is neutralized via compensating transfers, the insurance benefits of social security dominate the cost arising from labor supply distortions and stronger liquidity constraints both in the US and in Germany. These studies do, however, not provide us with micro-economic empirical evidence on who invests in or foregoes survivor protection in pension annuities. This literature is much smaller, and although it provides valuable insights into annuitization choices, most previous empirical studies use outdated data for the United States (Holden et al., 1986; Myers, 1987; Turner, 1988; Holden and Nicholson, 1998; Johnson et al., 2005) . An additional drawback of the existing research is that it was motivated by concerns about the retirement security of widows, implying that most of these studies focus exclusively on the annuitization decisions of married men (e.g., Holden et al., 1986; Holden & Nicholson, 1998) . Moreover, only a few of these studies examined the decision to engage in a survivors' pension plan at the time retiring workers have to make this choice. Instead, most of these studies on survivor protection focus on current characteristics of individuals who are already retired, although it is likely that the decision to invest in a survivors' pension plan was made many years earlier. 2 This study thus contributes to the literature on survivor's pensions in several ways. First, we add to the literature by reconsidering survivor pension decisions by using recent data that better fit into the current legal, social, and economic environment and are also more closely related to the European context. Second, the stated preferences approach allows us to elicit more accurately the true preferences for survivor's protection than previous studies that rely on revealed preferences, as the survivor pension options within current pension schemes are hard to comprehend for an average worker. Third, the randomization of the key conditions in the vignettes further allows us to make causal claims about the relative importance of the monthly family income during working life, the relative contribution to family income of both partners during working life, the survival probability of the partner, and the duration of the survival of the partner. Fourth, we further contribute by also considering the survivor pension decisions of women. This is important because female labor market participation has been increasing in most European countries, and married women therefore retire with increasingly substantial work experience and pension coverage in their own names, implying that their annuitization choices can no longer be ignored. Finally, we go beyond previous studies by showing that the redistribution of pension wealth to survivor pensions in the Netherlands strongly depends on personality characteristics such as time preferences, risk preferences and altruism as well as respondent's perceptions of their partner's economic preferences.
2 Johnson et al. (2005) is a notable exception who focused on survivor pension decisions of both gender types. This study examines the payout decision and measures the share of married retirees in the United States with pension annuities who forego survivor protection somewhat more recently (until 2001) and shows that one quarter (28%) of married men and two thirds of married women receiving employer-sponsored retirement annuities declined survivor protection. This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the Dutch pension system and the first pillar survivors pension scheme. Section 3 describes the data, experimental design, and variables used in the analyses. Section 4 presents the main analyses. Finally, Section 5 summarizes our findings and sets forth our conclusions.
Dutch retirement system

Pillars of the Dutch retirement system
Although our stated preference experiment uses vignettes in which respondents had to make a choice between hypothetical pension schemes, it is important to have a good overview of the Dutch retirement system in order to see to what extent the hypothetical pension schemes are realistic for the respondents. The Dutch pension system consists of three pillars (see De Grip et al. (2012; for more details). The first consists of a flat-rate public scheme (AOW) to which all citizens are entitled, regardless of whether they are employee, self-employed, or never participated in the labor market.
The AOW provides Dutch citizens with a pension benefit that guarantees 70% of the net minimum wage for a single household and 50% for each partner in a couple (either married or officially living together). For decades, the eligibility age for the AOW was 65. Due to recent reforms in 2013 and 2015, the eligibility age for the AOW is gradually increasing to 66 years in 2018 and 67 in 2021.
After 2021, the eligibility age will be linked to life expectancy in the Netherlands. By this algorithm the eligibility age for the AOW has recently been further increased to 67 years and 3 months in 2022.
The second pillar consists of supplementary earnings-related pensions. This is a (hybrid) 3 defined-benefit type of pension for employees organized at the sector or firm level. Sector pensions are negotiated between unions and employer organizations at the sector or firm level and are in most cases set forth in collective agreements. Participation is mandatory, ensuring that each worker is covered by sector pensions. The Pensions and Savings Act (Pensioen en Spaarfondsenwet) until 2007 and the Pensions Act from 2007 onwards (Pensioenwet) dictate that the administration of the sector pension schemes in the second pillar is delegated to pension funds to which both employers and employees have to contribute. Pension benefits in the second pillar are based on the average wage workers have built up over their entire career. These average wage schemes have by now almost totally replaced the final salary schemes, based on employees' last wage. The second pillar pension can be used to retire early or late, before or after the eligibility age for the state pension. 4
The earliest age people can claim second pillar pension benefits is 60 years, while the latest age is 70 years. Replacement rates depend on the age at retirement. Early retirement leads to lower benefits.
The third pillar includes all voluntarily built-up savings that are in addition to the first two pillars. Due to the well-established first two pillars of the Dutch pension system, the third pillar is less developed in the Netherlands than in other countries. The first two pillars combined already generate pension replacement rates that are amongst the most generous in the world (OECD 2017). 5 In 2015, the first two pillars yielded a gross replacement rate of about 69% (of the average wage) when a typical worker in the public sector retired full-time at age 64. This worker experienced an accrual rate of approximately 5% for each year he or she retires earlier (people can retire from 60 years onwards) or later (until age 70). This implies that the gross replacement rate would be about 65% when retiring at age 63, approximately 80% when retiring at age 66 (the new eligibility age for the AOW in 2018), and approximately 99% when retiring at age 70. 6
Survivors pensions in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands, in case a partner or ex-partner has passed away, those who were financially dependent on the deceased are entitled to a benefit under the General Surviving Relatives Act (Algemene nabestaandenwet, ANW benefit). The amount of the surviving relative's benefit depends on the income of the surviving relative. There is a maximum of 70% of the minimum wage. The deceased partner must have been insured when he/she passed away; in other words, he or she must have lived in the Netherlands or have worked and paid tax in the Netherlands.
Everyone who lives or works in the Netherlands is automatically insured under the ANW.
Eligibility for a benefit under the ANW, however, depends on very specific conditions. The partner of a deceased insured person is entitled to an ANW benefit if: (1) he or she has an unmarried child who is under the age of 18, (2) is expecting a child, (3) or is more than 45% incapacitated for work.
The ANW benefit stops if the partner no longer has an unmarried child who is under 18 (or the child goes to live in another household), is no longer more than 45% incapacitated for work, reaches the statutory retirement age under the General Old Age Pensions Act (AOW), remarries or starts living together with a partner.
Because of these strict eligibility rules, only a small fraction of partners is eligible for an ANW benefit. Employees therefore increasingly depend on building up a survivors pension for their partner within the second pillar supplementary pension schemes or private life insurance with their surviving spouse as beneficiary.
Data and experimental design
Data collection
The Dutch public sector's pension fund (ABP) gave us access to 7,520 randomly selected e-mail addresses of public sector employees born between 1952 and 1975. In the first week of April 2015, we sent an e-mail to these employees containing the link to a web-based survey (the ROA Public Sector Survey 2015). This survey included questions on individual characteristics, sources of income after retirement, partner characteristics and the stated preferences experiment we use to investigate workers' preferences for redistribution of individual pension wealth to survivor pensions. In total, 1,760 working respondents completed the survey. 7 Because Eggers et al. (2015) showed that preferences observed in stated-preference experiments in particular are close to revealed preferences when respondents' engagement with the choices to be made is high, we select 1,586 respondents in the age of 50-65 years old in our estimation sample.
The stated preferences experiment includes vignettes that focus on various pension redistribution opportunities, which form the basis of our analyses. As all respondents replied to six vignettes, we have data on 9,511 observations of employees' choices with respect to the redistribution of their pension income to the survivor pension of their partner.
Stated-preference experiment
Our stated-preference experiment is explicitly designed for individuals aged 55 years or older and who are not yet retired and uses vignettes in which individuals had to choose between various hypothetical, yet realistic pension redistribution scenarios. The stated preference experiment was introduced by a short text explaining the topic, after which employees were assigned to six vignettes. Figure A1 in the Appendix shows the introductory text and an example vignette.
In each vignette respondents have to choose between 5 redistribution options that differ with respect to (1) the height of the monthly pension benefits until one's own death and (2) the actuarially related pension of the widowed partner after one's own death. The five options refer to a smoothing of the difference between the height of the pension benefits until one's own death and the height of the pension of the widowed partner by 0% up to 100%.
There are four conditions which define the situation in which the redistribution choices are made. These conditions refer to (1) monthly family income during working life ranging from 5,000, 6,250, to 7,500 Euro, (2) the relative contribution to family income of both partners during working life (ranging from 100% oneself & 0% partner, 75% oneself & 25% partner, 50% oneself & 50% partner, to 25% oneself & 75% partner), (3) the survival probability of the partner ranging from 40%, 60%, to 80%, and (4) the duration of the survival of the partner, ranging from 3, 5, to 8 years.
The values of the four relevant conditions exogenously vary across the vignettes as they are randomly drawn from the set of possible levels. Table 1 presents an overview of the conditions and their values in the vignettes. 8
8 Table A1 further shows how two different randomization scenarios affect the randomization choice options displayed to the respondent. It shows that when partners contribute more to the household income, the gap in their survivor pension is lower. Table A2 in Appendix A indicates that the randomization of the various values resulted in an equal distribution over the values distinguished in all four conditions. These four conditions for the redistribution choices are carefully chosen based on the existing literature. The gross family income has been included as earlier work shows that couples with low income tend to elect single life annuities, maximizing their pension income when both spouses are alive and assuming the risk that the spouse will outlive the pensioner (Holden et al. 1986 ). The gross family income of 6,250 euro in the experiment closely matches actual gross family income in the Dutch public and education sector as indicated by the LISS panel data 2017). The share in the contribution to the household income before retirement is important as it has major implications for the loss in pension income of the survivor. The lower one's share is to the contribution to the household income before retirement, the lower one's share is to the total pension wealth. Hence, workers whose partner have pension coverage from their own employers should be automatically less inclined to invest in survivors pensions . Moreover, evidence by Boskin and Kotlikoff (1985) , Altonji et al. (1992), and Wilhelm (1996) show that the distribution of consumption within extended families is strongly dependent on the distribution of resources within extended families. It is therefore of vital importance to include the share in the contribution to the household income as a context condition into our stated preferences experiment.
The survival probability and the duration of survival are relevant as the chances that the spouse will eventually receive survivor benefits generally increase when the pensioner has health problems. Retirees in poor health with shorter life expectancies than their spouses are especially likely to select survivor annuities over single life annuities (Holden et al., 1986; Turner, 1988; Holden & Nicholson, 1998; Johnson et al. 2005) .
Personal characteristics and preferences
Our survey also includes various personal characteristics that have been shown to affect investment decisions and are likely to also influence employees' decisions on the extent to which they will redistribute their future pension wealth to a survivors pension for their partner. We include data on respondents' gender, age, and level of education. Furthermore, we include variables with respect to respondents' time preference, risk aversion, and altruism. Time preference is measured with the survey question 'How willing are you to give up something that is beneficial for you today in order to benefit more from that in the future?' Respondents could answer on a scale from 0-10 where 0 indicated 'completed unwilling to do so' and 10 indicated 'very willing to do so'. Risk aversion is measured by a subjective risk question. Respondents indicate on a scale from 0-10 to what extent the following statement applies to them: 'How do you see yourself: are you a person who is generally willing to take risks, or do you try to avoid risks? Please self-grade your choice (ranging between 0 (extremely risk averse) and 10 (extremely willing to take risks))' Altruism is measured using the answers of the following question 'Imagine the following situation: today you unexpectedly received 1000 euro. How much of this amount would you give to charities without expecting anything in return?'. These three survey questions have been widely used in behavioral literature and have been extensively validated (see e.g., Dohmen et al., 2011; and Falk et al., 2018) .
For our regression analyses, we standardize these measures.
Finally, the survey asked respondents to indicate how their partner would score on the same measures for time preference, risk aversion, and altruism using exactly the same questions and answer scales. The answers to these questions can be relevant for the decision to redistribute pension income when financial decisions in the household are made jointly by both partners.
However, it should be noted that it only concerns respondents' perception of their partners' economic preferences. Most likely, these measures include considerable measurement error. Table 2 shows summary statistics of respondents' main background characteristics. We observe that on average the respondents are almost 61 years old, implying that they are close to retirement.
Descriptive statistics
The table further shows that the majority of respondents in our analysis are male and highly educated. The proportion of highly educated public sector workers in our sample is consistent with that in other representative data sets, such as the Dutch Labour Supply Panel and the Dutch Labour Force Survey. Respondents, on average, score 6.88 on the time preference scale and 6.20 on the risk aversion scale, respectively. These average scores and their underlying distributions are very close to those found in other surveys (Dohmen et al., 2011) . Finally, respondents are, on average, willing to give 101 euros of in total 1000 euros to charities. Note, however, that the standard deviation is large: 28.81% of all respondents is not willing to give anything, while 13.68% is willing to give 50 euro, 25.83% is willing to give 100 euro and 12.78% is willing to give 200 euro or more.
Empirical strategy
The experimental design of our study allows us to estimate simple OLS models in which we regress the preferred age redistribution level on the conditions which values exogenously vary over the vignettes. By doing so, we identify to what extent the redistribution preferences depend on family income, the contributions of both partners to the family income, the survival probability of the partner and the number of years the partner is expected to survive. Because all respondents replied to six choice sets, we use a clustered sandwich estimator to allow for intragroup correlation at the individual level (Rogers 1993; Wooldridge 2002) .
Results
Descriptive results
In the stated-preferences experiment, we allow respondents to redistribute joint pension income towards a survivor' pension given a randomized set of changing conditions. As mentioned, the experiment incorporates five consecutive steps of redistribution (in steps of 25%) ranging from no redistribution, where the widowed partner is only entitled to standard old-age pension, to full redistribution where the widowed partner receives the same pension income as when his/her partner was still alive. Figure 1 shows some first descriptive evidence that the distribution of preferred levels of pension redistribution is close to normal with a preferred pension redistribution of 50%:
35% of all individuals have such a preference, irrespective of the attributes of the stated choice experiment. Figure 1 also shows that 33% of all individuals would prefer less or no redistribution.
This result is close to the results found by Johnson et al. (2005) for the United States in the 1990s.
Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, they found that 28% of married men receiving employer-sponsored retirement annuities declined spousal survivor protection during the period between 1992 and 2000. However, we also find that 32% would prefer to redistribute more pension income to the partner upon one's death. 11% of all workers would even be willing to completely smooth joint pension income and the survivor pension of their partner. This is remarkable as this redistribution option almost always leads to a drop in net pension wealth of the household (including the accumulation of the joint pension benefits as well as the survivor's pension benefits).
Basic model estimates
We regress the preferred level of pension redistribution on the conditions set in the stated choice experiment. Table 3 reports the estimation results. Owing to the pattern displayed in Figure 1 , we model the preferred pension redistribution using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS, Column 1). In addition, we also test for alternative specifications: an Ordered Probit model (Column 2) to capture the ordered nature of the answer categories in the stated choice experiment, and a Multinomial Logit model (Columns 3-5) to test for non-linearities. 9
Column (1) of Table 3 shows that the total family income during working life does not play a role for the redistribution of pension income in favor of the surviving partner. This seems inconsistent with existing studies on survivor pensions in the United States, which show that lowincome couples tend to invest in single life annuities instead of survivors pensions (Holden et al. 1986 ). However, the multinomial results (Columns 3-5) do show a stronger preference for 50% redistribution among mid-income households compared to low-income households.
We further find that the relative contribution to the household income of the two partners before retirement does matter for the preferred pension income redistribution. Compared to the situation in which individuals contribute 100% to family income, those who contribute 25% (and their partner 75%) have much a lower preference for full redistribution (Column 1). This preference is economically significant as it amounts to 0.6-point on the one to five answer scale. This also holds to a lesser extent for households with a 50-50 contribution to the total household income.
These results are confirmed by the Ordered Probit estimation (Column 2), and the Multinomial Logit model (Column 3-5), which suggests that the relation is close to linear.
When the likelihood that the partner survives is high (80%), individuals have a significantly stronger preference for more redistribution (Column 1). The size of the effect is about 0.10-point on the one to five answer scale. The expected number of surviving years by the partner also matters for pension redistribution: the preference for pension redistribution increases with the number of years the partner is expected to survive. The OLS estimates indicate that if the partner survives 9 We here distinguish among three categories: individuals who prefer to redistribute less than 50%, those with a preference for 50-50 redistribution, and those who prefer to redistribute more than 50%. eight years (compared to three years) individuals have a 0.14-point higher preference for more redistribution on the one to five answer scale. Again, these results of the survival likelihood and the number of survival years are confirmed by the Ordered Probit estimation (Column 2), whereas the Multinomial Logit model suggests (Column 3-5) that both relationships are linear.
Explaining the redistribution in pension wealth
The preference for redistribution likely depends on personal characteristics, preferences and social attitude. In particular, it is interesting to what extent gender has an impact on the decision to redistribute pension wealth to survivors' pensions. As more married women retire with increasingly substantial work experience and pension coverage in their own names it is important to get more insight into their annuitization choices compared to those of males. Table 4 confirms that personal characteristics, preferences, and social attitude play an important role for the willingness to contribute own pension wealth to survivors' pensions. Column 1 shows the results of an OLS regression in which we include standard personal characteristics such as gender, age and level of education. 10 We first observe that because of the randomization (see Table A2 in Appendix A), the successive inclusion of background characteristics does not alter the point estimates of the attributes included in the stated choice experiment. More important, however, is that the results in Column 1 show that males have a significantly stronger preference for redistribution compared to females. This preference is economically significant as it amounts to a third of a point on the one to five answer scale (i.e., about 11% of the overall mean). A potential explanation is that this result is due to remaining traditional gender role models for this relatively old age cohort. Although gender roles are gradually changing, in particular in older cohorts the traditional breadwinner model can still play an important role. For younger cohorts, we might expect that gender roles are substantially different, because these cohorts have become more accustomed to more equal gender roles (see e.g. Lundberg et al. 2016) .
Column 1 indeed confirms that age, even in the narrow age window of our sample, correlates significantly to stronger preferences for pension redistribution: a 10 years increase in age is associated with a 0.2 point increase preference for more redistribution on the one to five answer scale. Finally, compared to intermediate and low-educated workers, high-educated workers 11 prefer less redistribution, but depending on the specification, this is only weakly significant. Table 4 successively analyzes the relevance of time discounting, risk aversion, and altruism for the willingness to redistribute pension wealth to survivors' pensions.
Columns 2-4 of
Time preferences and risk aversion are economic preferences, which have shown to be fundamental determinants of decision making in economic models. Their importance is confirmed by studies showing that individual differences in risk aversion and impatience predict a wide range of important economic outcomes (e.g., Guiso and Paiella 2008; Eckel et al. 2005) . With respect to pension savings, intertemporal economic choice models conjecture that individuals formulate assumptions about their lifetime resources and make consumption decisions on these anticipated resources, rather than simply base their decision on the available current income. Smoothing consumption over their own lifetime and their survivor will indeed require a forward-looking perspective. We would therefore expect that more forward-looking respondents are more willing to redistribute part of their pension wealth to their survivor's pension. Similarly, we would also expect that more risk averse workers are more willing to redistribute pension wealth in favor of a survivor's pension. Barsky et al. (1997) showed that risk aversion has predictive power for choices over a number of risky behaviors, including the decisions to smoke or drink as well as to hold stocks or to take out insurance. Brown (2001) further confirmed that household decisions about whether or not to annuitize retirement resources are positively related to risk aversion.
Moreover, it is rather intuitive to conjecture that more altruistic individuals are willing to give more to their spouse, and, hence, are also more willing to redistribute their pension income to a survivor's pension. Various economic studies have expressed altruism in terms of one person including another person's consumption in his or her utility function (e.g. Becker (1974) on love and caring between husband and wife and Becker (1981) on altruism). And several studies have found that that altruism is indeed a major driver of bequest motives (e.g. Laitner and Juster, (1996) and Laitner and Ohlsson 2001) . Table 4 shows that forward looking individuals have a significantly stronger preference for more redistribution of pension income to the survivor's pension: a one standard deviation increase in time preference results is a 0.071 higher preference for more redistribution on the one to five scale (Column 2). This even increase to 0.088 when we control for risk preferences and altruism (Columns 3 and 4). This is an economically significant effect as it has a similar size of that of an increase in the survival probability of the spouse from 40% to 80%.
Both risk preferences and altruism are also significantly and positively related to the preference for more redistribution. The coefficients (0.057 for risk preferences and 0.047 for altruism) are, however, smaller than the coefficient for time preference. Interestingly, the inclusion of time preference, risk preference, and altruism do not affect the coefficients of the other personal characteristics. In particular, the stronger preference for pension redistribution among males compared to females cannot be explained by underlying differences in economic preferences or social attitudes.
Interaction stated preferences experiment conditions with personal characteristics
Individuals' personal characteristics can matter for how they consider the relevance of various attributes of the stated-preference experiment when making their pension redistribution decision. Table 5 reports the OLS estimates for models in which each of the personal characteristics included in Table 4 is interacted to the various attributes. We find no significant interaction with respect to age, risk preference, and altruism, suggesting that the main effects for the stated-preference attributes reported in Table 4 do not vary with these characteristics. The only relevant interactions pertain to respondents' own contribution to the family income. 12 We find that compared to females, males are more inclined to redistribute more to their spouse's survival pension even when their own contribution during working life is only 25% of the total household income (Column 1). This is best seen in Figure 2 that plots the gender interaction with the contribution to family income for the preferred level of pension redistribution. This is again an indication of stronger redistributive preferences among males.
We further find that when the respondent's contribution to the family income equals 25% of total income, a strong future orientation is associated with a lower preference for pension redistribution (Column 4 of Table 5 ). This compensates for the positive effect of time preferences on pension redistribution. Overall, the differences in preferences for pension redistribution are not statistically significant for those who differ in their time preference when their own contribution to family income is only 25%, while this is the case when they contribute more than 25% (see Figure   3 ). The figure thus shows that the gradient in the preferences for redistribution is steeper for those 12 Highly-educated individuals have a significantly stronger preference for more redistribution when the likelihood of the partner surviving is 60% (compared to 40%), but this does not hold for the highest surviving probability making it hard to fully grab the mechanism behind this result. Moreover, the coefficient of the likelihood that the partner survives has a negative sign which compensates the positive interaction effect. A margin plot further showed that there is no real statistically different effect of education on the likelihood that the partner survives (available on request). who are strongly forward looking: their preference for redistribution declines faster with decreasing shares of their own contribution to family income, possibly because of considerations of having a too low pension income themselves while they are still alive.
Perception of partners' economic preferences
If partners decide on the redistribution of pension income, we can expect that they consider their partners' preferences. The economic preferences of the partner may than have an effect on the redistribution outcomes independent of the impact of the economic preferences of the respondent.
Raw correlations between the economic preferences of the respondents and the perception of their partner's economic preferences indicates that this may be the case. These correlations are relatively small: 0.473 for time preferences, 0.480 for risk aversion, and 0.331 for altruism, implying that the perceptions of partner's economic preferences are indeed measuring something different than one's own economic preferences. Table 6 reports OLS estimates for models in which we next to the respondent's own economic preferences include the perceptions of the economic preferences of their partner. The table shows that the size of the coefficients of respondent's own economic preferences remains roughly the same when we include their perceptions of their spouse's economic preferences. Only the size of the coefficient of the time preferences decreases to 0.058, but remains significant at the 10%-level. Most interestingly, however, is that we observe a statistically significant coefficient for the time preference of the partner of 0.060, which implies that the forward looking behavior of the partner might be as important for the decision to redistribute pension income to the partner than the respondent's own income. Although this result should be interpreted cautiously due to potential measurement problems, it is consistent with recent literature that emphasizes the importance of the bargaining and joint decision process between spouses for retirement and savings decisions (e.g., Lundberg et al. 2003; Shuey 2004; Lalive 2017) .
Conclusion
This paper uses a stated-preferences approach to estimate the willingness of Dutch workers to redistribute their own pension wealth to increase the survivor pension of their partner after their death. Our results show that the distribution of the preferred levels of pension redistribution is close to normal. Furthermore, we find that total family income during working life does not affect the redistribution of respondents' pension wealth to the survivor pension of their spouse. However, the relative contribution to total family income before retirement of both partners, as well as the survival likelihood of the partner and the number of years the partner is expected to survive, do have a significant impact on the redistribution in favor of the survivor's pension.
The redistribution to survivor pensions also depends on personal characteristics, preferences and social attitude. Males have a significantly stronger preference for redistribution compared to females. Moreover, forward-looking, more risk averse and more altruistic individuals have a stronger preference to redistribute part of their pension wealth to a survivor's pension.
Finally, when workers perceive that their partner is forward looking, they also redistribute more of their pension wealth to the survivor pension of their spouse.
This study adds to the literature on survivors' pensions in multiple ways. First, we use recent data that better fit into the current legal, social, and economic environment and are closer related to the European context so that we get more reliable insights in the importance of survivors' pensions after the retrenchment of pension wealth due to the pension reforms that took place in many developed countries. Second, the stated-preferences approach allows us to elicit more accurately the true preferences for survivor's protection than previous studies. Third, the randomization of the key conditions in the vignettes allows us to make causal claims about the relative importance of the monthly family income during working life, the relative contribution to family income of both partners during working life, the survival probability of the partner, and the duration of the survival of the partner for the redistribution of pension wealth to the surviving partner. Fourth, we consider the survivor pension decisions of women, which have been largely ignored in previous studies. Finally, we go beyond other studies by showing that survivor pension investments in the Netherlands strongly depend on time preferences, risk preferences, and altruism as well as the economic preferences of partners.
From our results, we can conclude that the demand for survivor's pensions will probably remain high in the coming years. This holds in particular for males, although we might expect that this gender difference may disappear in the distant future due to gradually changing gender roles.
It is vital to be aware that true preferences for survivor's protection may be much stronger than current revealed preferences show, due to the lacking transparency in the communication on survivors' pensions. Therefore, it is important to improve the knowledge of particularly those who will retire in the coming years on the survivor pension options that are present in the current pension schemes. The fact that economic preferences of both partners matter, indicates further that communication plans should not focus on the individual level, but should be targeted to households in general. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Income redistribution measured on a 5-points scale where 1 indicates that no pension redistribution takes place and 5 means that full pension distribution takes place. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Income redistribution measured on a 5-points scale where 1 indicates that no pension redistribution takes place and 5 means that full pension distribution takes place. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Income redistribution measured on a 5-points scale where 1 indicates that no pension redistribution takes place and 5 means that full pension distribution takes place. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Income redistribution measured on a 5-points scale where 1 indicates that no pension redistribution takes place and 5 means that full pension distribution takes place. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
